The swine that created The Swine Flu “Pandemic” of 1976

What "conspiracy" looks like.

Buckle up, this is a long one. There is no short way to tell a long story.

“Conspiracy Theory” are two words that have been most effectively weaponised to shut down dissent and criticism. These two words have an almost magical power to kill curiosity.

“Conspiracy” invokes images of round men, with bulbous noses, smoking cigars in small oak paneled rooms conspiring and conniving to get the better of everyone else. And obviously those people don’t exist, do they? And remember what they say about secrets, “Three people can keep a secret, if two of them are dead”. So, obviously people cannot keep secrets so the idea of many people conspiring is just silly.

“Theory” invokes, well…theory. It’s just a theory anyway, and there are other theories, and who says your theory is the right one anyway, especially considering that your theory followed the word “Conspiracy”.

The question that I find more interesting isn’t whether some people can keep a secret, but whether an institution (that is obviously full of people) can first claim and then work towards something that is NOT true. That’s really it in a nutshell, I think.

If you think the answer is NO, that institutions are always truthful and always work towards true ends. Then you are either 6 years old or work for one of these institutions that pays your mortgage. Beliefs tend to grow around incentives, like vines around the closest structure.

In you think the answer is YES, then you by definition have accepted that large groups of people can claim and work towards aims that are not true. No round men, no bulbous noses…maybe the occasional cigar.

If you are reading this, you are likely already awake to the untruths that have rewired the global grid of sense making. So, to an extent I am preaching to the converted.

And as you know, talking to the unconverted is very, very hard. They simply cannot believe “that all these people could be lying”. That’s why I think the Swine Flu “Pandemic” of 1976 is so important, because it is accepted by all sides that it was a case of industrial scale malfeasance. There is no debate on the subject anymore. It is hard fact. Even the BBC and Wikipedia, two of the most propagandist of organisations, are happy to openly admit it. The “Fact Checkers” don’t even bother with it.

Robert Kennedy Jr. is his recent treasure The Real Anthony Fauci (2021) spends some time explaining the CDC and government malfeasance of 1976. Dr. Peter Duesberg also in his wonderful book Inventing the AIDS virus (1996) spends some time explaining how it came about. Kennedy focuses more on the vaccine debacle and Duesberg focuses more of the mechanics of how the “pandemic” was created. Both of these perspectives when brought together form a complete picture of the whole tragedy from its creation to its ugly and disastrous end.

What I have done here is extract both sections and “stitched” them together to give you a complete view of the story as told by two of the most qualified people to tell it.

1976 is not that long ago, and the institutions that created The Swine Flu “Pandemic” are the same institutions that we are dealing with today, expect much bigger, with much more money and far more practiced in the dark arts. They are doing it again.

They are like the abusive, wife beating husband, with three divorces under his belt, who is single and circulating looking for a fourth wife. He’s obviously very charming (three previous women married him) and he finds a poor fourth woman. She doesn’t know about the beatings; he obviously isn’t going to tell her. He gives her wonderfully practiced stories about how he has been unlucky in love and how all his ex-wife’s were different versions of crazy.

The starry eyed fourth woman nods her belief, as she is in a trance of sorts. She obviously isn’t going to call the ex-wifes and do a “reference check” and they cannot be believed anyway, they are likely crazy with jealousy that I finally managed to catch a wonderful man that they couldn’t hold onto. And so, the story of the poor fourth wife unfolds in the most predictable of patterns.

We are that poor fourth wife, and these institutions are the wife beating husband that marries one generation after the next with wonderful promises of health and security. Promising that they will look after us. Very few do any type of historical reference checking, and certainly very few want to talk to crazy ex-wifes and “conspiracy theorists”.

This is why The Swine Flu of 1976 is SO important…didn’t I just say that? I am happy to repeat myself on this point, it’s that important.

The Swine Flu “Pandemic” of 1976 is the first wife (for the purposes of this metaphor, there are probably other girlfriends in the past, but you get the picture) and nobody disputes that the CDC and the government beat her up well and good.

If we cannot get people to believe in the current husband’s malfeasance maybe, we can get them to believe in his past malfeasance.

The proper place to start this story is with the EIS: The Epidemic Intelligence Service.

Here is Duesberg to tell us about it.

-Inventing the AIDS (Dr. Peter Duesberg)

EIS: The “Medical CIA”

By the start of the Korean War, Langmuir had talked public health officials and Congress into giving the CDC contingent powers to deal with potential emergencies. He shut down the malaria project, freeing millions of dollars to create a special new division of the CDC. In July of 1951 he assembled the first class of the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), composed of twenty­ three young medical or public health graduates. After six weeks of intensive epidemiological training, these EIS officers were assigned for two years to hospitals or state and local health departments around the country. Upon completing their field experience, EIS alumni were free to pursue any career they desired, on the assumption that their loyalties would remain with the CDC and that they would permanently act as its eyes and ears. The focus of this elite unit was on activism rather than research and was expressed in its symbol-a shoe sole worn through with a hole. According to British epidemiologist Gordon Stewart, a former CDC consultant, the EIS was nicknamed the "medical CIA."

Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) Home Page | CDC

Every summer since 1951 a new class of carefully chosen EIS recruits has been trained, some classes exceeding one hundred people in size. Although a complete list of EIS officers and alumni was available until the spring of 1993, its members rarely advertise their affiliation; now the membership directory has been withdrawn from public circulation. Over the past four decades two thousand EIS trainees reached key positions throughout this country and the world. Many work in the CDC itself, others in various agencies of the federal government; one of the original 1951 graduates, William Stewart, went on to become the Surgeon General of the United States during the late 1960s. Some have staffed the World Health Organization (WHO), including Jonathan Mann and Michael Merson, the two directors of WHO's Global Program on AIDS, while their fellow agents can be found in the health departments of foreign nations. Several dozen have entered university public health programs as teachers and researchers. Roughly 150 have taken jobs in state or local health departments, closely watching every outbreak of disease. Hundreds have become private practice doctors, dentists, or even veterinarians, while others work in hospitals. Some have joined biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies or have risen in the ranks of major insurance corporations. Some reside within tax-exempt foundations, helping direct the spending of trust funds on medical projects.

A few have obtained prominent positions in the media. Lawrence Altman became a medical journalist for the New York Times in 1969 and is now its head medical writer. Bruce Dan joined ABC News as its Chicago medical editor for six years beginning in 1984, the same year he became a senior editor of the influential Journal of the American Medical Association UAMA), a position he held for nine years. JAMA regularly publishes a section written by the CDC. Marvin Turck has held the title of editor at the University of Washington's Journal of Infectious Diseases since 1988. These three men were recruited into the EIS in 1963, 1979, and 1960, respectively--each one years before he entered the media.

Regardless of which career paths EIS alumni take, the vast majority of them retain their contacts with the CDC. Not only do they constitute an informal surveillance network, but they can act as unrecognized advocates for the CDC viewpoint, whether as media journalists or as prominent physicians. And they serve as a reservoir of trained personnel for any CDC-defined emergency. As Langmuir himself described it in 1952, "One of the primary purposes of the Epidemic Intelligence Services of CDC is to recruit and train such a corps of epidemiologists... As a result of their experience, many of these officers may well remain in full-time epidemiology or other public health pursuits at federal, state, or local levels. Some, no doubt, will return to civilian, academic, or clinical practice, but in the event of war they could be returned to active duty with the Public Health Service and assigned to strategic areas to fulfill the functions for which they were trained.”

The EIS network has functioned very much as Langmuir first envisioned, except that it has grown up in the post-contagion industrial world, where infectious diseases have largely become subject matter for historians. The awaited biological attack never arrived. The CDC has nevertheless continued to exploit public trust by transforming seasonal flus and other minor epidemics into monstrous crises and by manufacturing contagious plagues out of non-infectious medical conditions.

Remember, Duesberg published his book in 1996, and at that point there were some 2,000 EIS trained people within the system, today according to EIS they have developed more than 3,900. Here are the 2020 (60 people) and 2021 (70 people) alumni.

EIS Class of 2020 | Who We Are | Epidemic Intelligence Service | CDC

EIS Class of 2021 | Who We Are | Epidemic Intelligence Service | CDC

As you can see, no round people (not even one) and no bulbous noses. Just young, very smart, and very ambitious people who are well intentioned. They have all been now trained to think in a particular way and respond to CDC direction when called on. Some of them have dreams of maybe running the CDC one day.

If you want to look for the best explanation of “conspiracy” and how organisations can claim and aim for untruths, look no further than careerism, because both of the primary incentives that run our lives are woven into it. Money and status, that is what careerism is. Any ideas, beliefs and god forbid “truths” that get in the way of that career will be swatted aside like that annoying mosquito that wakes you up in the middle of the night.

Now, let’s get on with creating a Swine Flu “Pandemic”.

-Inventing the AIDS (Dr. Peter Duesberg)

SEARCHING FOR EPIDEMICS

During the decades after its founding, the CDC searched for authentic public health emergencies. Tuberculosis was no longer the scourge of industrial nations, measles had largely stopped taking lives, and other potentially fatal diseases ranging from diphtheria to pneumonia ceased striking fear in the hearts of the public. Only polio was left, and by the 1960s it, too, basically vanished. In identifying "epidemics," then, the CDC was forced to attend to continually smaller outbreaks of disease. Before long, experts began defining contagious epidemics on the basis of disease "clusters." Almost any coincidence of two or more closely spaced persons contracting the same disease could qualify as an incipient epidemic, even if they occurred weeks or months apart.

This is an important point that Duesberg makes. Most of the scourges had gone or dramatically reduced primarily due to much better nutrition and sanitation. The vaccine industry managed to build itself AFTER all these diseases vanished, yet take credit for their vanishing. If you find this hard to believe, here are some graphs from Dissolving Illusions: Disease, Vaccines and Forgotten History (Humphries and Bystrianyk).

Measles

Pertussis (Whooping Cough)

Clustered outbreaks, however, provide no conclusive evidence of an infectious disease. When the bacteria hunters sought to blame scurvy, pellagra, and other vitamin-deficiency diseases on microbes, they mistakenly cited clusters of sick people to argue the diseases were spreading. Likewise, the virus hunters pointed to clusters to support their indictment of viruses for SMON and other noncontagious diseases. Clustering actually reveals very little information. It can reflect several people sharing the same diet, behavior, or environmental hazard of almost any kind, not just common exposure to a germ. Even in cases of truly infectious disease, clusters may only indicate a group of people is susceptible to a sickness for similar reasons, while other people infected by the same microbe will remain healthy-in other words, no epidemic will ensue. If anything, epidemiologists have classically studied clusters of sick people as clues to subtle environmental hazards, not infectious agents. But when public health officials issue ominous warnings about mysterious disease outbreaks, they terrify the public with visions of deadly pandemics.

The most recent examples include the premature panics generated by an imminent Hantavirus epidemic in the United States in 1994. The Hantavirus presumably had jumped species, from mice to American Navaho Indians. But after killing just a few, the virus made peace with the Indians and apparently retired to its mouse reservoir. The epidemic failed to materialize. A front-page article in the San Francisco Chronicle reported that CDC "epidemiologists [shown in space suits] across the nation are carefully monitoring the deer mouse population and the level of virus within it." But all that was left to discover of the former "Navajo flu" by the CDC epidemiologists in their space suits were healthy mice in the mountains of California.

In May 1995 the CDC rang the alarm once again, this time threatening with an imminent Ebola Virus pandemic. The deadly killer virus was expected to leave its hidden reservoir in the rain forests of Africa to claim Europe and the United States. The article in Time magazine was peppered with "CDC sleuths" in space suits and color electron micrographs of the virus, although the electron microscope cannot take color pictures, and no virus is colored. A CDC virologist suggested the virus could leave the rain forest if "we get a virus that is both deadly to man and transmitted in the air." A European epidemiologist who heads the United Nations' AIDS program echoed the CDC's alarm, warning, "It's theoretically feasible that an infected person from Kikwit could go to Kinshasa, get on a plane to New York, fall ill, and present transmission risk there." But within a month the epidemic had faded away in Africa and not a single Ebola case was reported in the United States or Europe.

A month later the CDC was once again sounding the alarm. In an article entitled "After AIDS, Super bugs Give Medicine the Jitters," the public was warned of an impending crisis in the form of "superbugs." Superbugs are strains of bacteria said to be highly resistant to antibiotics. As usual, the CDC issued its warnings in the form of a chorus of conforming voices recruited from within and without the agency. Robert Shope, professor of epidemiology at Yale, warned, "If we don't gear up to bring matters under control, we could face a new crisis similar to the AIDS epidemic or the influenza epidemic that killed 20 million people worldwide in I9I8 and I9I9." Ruth Berkelman, deputy director at the CDC, resounded, "If we continue to let this get out of hand, we're setting ourselves up for a major catastrophe ... I'm talking about going in for a routine operation and dying from an infection." Most people have no idea of the more than one thousand outbreaks of disease each year, including colds, seasonal flus, hepatitis, and numerous non-infectious syndromes, all running their course and disappearing, often despite remaining unexplained by scientists. They are natural coincidences between immunodeficiency acquired by some noncontagious risk factors, like drugs, and infections by anyone of the ubiquitous microbes, termed opportunistic infections. But these many outbreaks provide the CDC with its inexhaustible source of epidemics.

The first genuine success of the CDC emerged from the polio epidemic. Ironically, it was the vaccine against polio, not the disease itself, that provided the opportunity. The Salk vaccine was entering its large-scale testing phase in 1954, and Alexander Langmuir wanted a piece of the action for his fledgling EIS. Insisting on CDC participation in the field trials, Langmuir was able to assign EIS officers around the country to monitor newly immunized children. The EIS aggressively followed up the first cases of vaccine induced polio appearing in the spring of 1955 by ultimately uncovering the hundreds of victims, who then received national attention over the next several months. The findings of the EIS investigation led to the suspension of the Salk vaccine and to the political shake-up at the NIH that brought James Shannon to power. Although this incident involved neither a natural epidemic nor biological warfare, it built the CDC's reputation as an efficient surveillance agency.

The next major CDC initiative ended less spectacularly, yet the agency emerged untarnished. The spring of 1957 brought news of a flu sweeping nations of the Far East. Influenza is generally a rather benign disease, but CDC officials exploited memories of the deadly 1918 flu epidemic that returned with U.S. soldiers from Europe and killed nearly half a million people. The decision to predict a deadly flu epidemic was arbitrary, considering that thirty-nine flu seasons had since gone by without disaster. Ignoring the fact that circumstances in 1918 differed radically from 1957, the CDC rang the alarm over an imminent Asian flu epidemic. A frightened nation quickly jumped into line. Congress gave Eisenhower a half million dollars, a large sum at the time, into which Langmuir dipped to expand the ranks of the EIS. Seasonal flu did arrive by summer and continued spreading until the following winter. As soon as the epidemic began slowing, public health officers rushed to issue warnings of a second round.

In the end, the CDC and other agencies accomplished little or nothing to slow the epidemic. Large numbers of vaccine doses were crash-produced, mostly after the flu season had finished. The flu itself was probably no worse than in any other year, but the heightened surveillance of the disease, together with the frantic public warnings, helped feed the false impression of a particularly horrible epidemic. Several leading public health experts openly criticized the over-hyped flu scare, and some of them suggested the whole incident merely helped stimulate vaccine sales. But the CDC came out ahead anyway as a heroic group, having gained public acceptance for mass immunization on command. Since the Asian flu, the CDC has regularly produced vaccines of unproven effectiveness for each new flu season and has maintained a permanent flu surveillance program.

With its political standing secured, the CDC began expanding its reach into virtually any disease over which it could gain authority. Collaborations with other biomedical institutions often worked to promote both parties. One such arrangement directly fueled the Virus-Cancer Program. During the early 1960s, EIS personnel were assigned to investigate every cluster of leukemia cases reported anywhere in the country and to search for a virus on the assumption leukemia was infectious. The efforts amounted to little more than a wild goose chase, but in medical circles the repetitive publicity surrounding these random clusters drummed into every scientist's head the notion that viruses must cause cancer. Most researchers, after all, had readily accepted the belief that clustering somehow proved a disease to be contagious. The National Cancer Institute backed this EIS project enthusiastically, and it ultimately benefited through the extra funding it received for chasing cancer viruses. Robert Gallo was one of the young scientists powerfully influenced by such thinking.

Until the advent of AIDS, however, the CDC's most ambitious program-and its most embarrassing disaster-played itself out in 1976. By that time the EIS network of officers and alumni had so widely penetrated hospitals, health departments, and other institutions that, potentially, any minor disease outbreak could easily be detected. In January 1976 five soldiers at Fort Dix in New Jersey contracted a flu. One of them died after overexerting himself against doctor's orders. Such a minor episode met the CDC criteria for a cluster, and the agency sprang into action.

Since 1966 the CDC director had been David Sencer, a medical doctor by training who had experience in various research, public health, and administrative jobs and who had just received an honorary membership to the EIS in 1975. Sencer used a local flu outbreak at Fort Dix as an opportunity to replay the Asian flu public relations victory of 1957, only on a larger scale. Relying on historical precedent, Sencer declared an imminent flu epidemic that would rival the deadly plague of 1918. But what Sencer failed to understand was that Americans in 1976 were much less vulnerable to infectious disease as opposed to the undernourished, immunodeficient people at the end of World War I. The new epidemic was nicknamed "swine flu," based on the belief that pigs were the reservoir for this human virus.

David Sencer – CDC Director

As you can see the CDC has tried to ignite the pandemic fire repeatedly. It succeeded in 1976 with The Swine Flu, it failed in 1995 with Ebola but it succeeded beyond its wildest dreams with AIDS in 1984. We are still living with the “success” of the AIDS campaign today. The “scientific” and medical world that AIDS built gave us COVID19.

-The Real Anthony Fauci (Robert Kennedy Jr.)

As chief of the NIAID’s Clinical Physiology Section of the Laboratory of Clinical Investigation, Dr. Fauci was, in 1976, a frontline spectator during the NIH’s bogus swine flu pandemic.

That year, a soldier at Fort Dix died of a lung ailment following a forced march. Army physicians sent some samples to CDC, which identified the malady as a swine flu. Dr. Fauci’s NIAID boss, Richard Krause (who Dr. Fauci would shortly replace), labored with his CDC counterpart, David Sencer, to spread terror of a catastrophic pandemic and initiate public demand for a vaccine. The NIAID chief convened in-house strategy sessions with Merck’s iconic vaccine developer Maurice Hilleman and other immunization industry nabobs. Congressional investigators subsequently landed the notes from those consultations, in which Dr. Hilleman candidly confesses that the resulting vaccine “had nothing to do with science and everything to do with politics.” In the August 2020 Rolling Stone, Gerald Posner, author of Pharma: Greed, Lies, and the Poisoning of America, recounted how Merck and other manufacturers utilized their secret meeting with the regulators to hatch a scheme that would guarantee industry profits while shielding Pharma from liability. This innovation—now a persistent feature of Big Pharma’s business model—turned out to be carte blanche for negligent and even criminal behavior.

Fauci has a front seat during 1976, and learned whatever he needed to learn from Sencer, especially on how to not get caught if you fail. He also figured out very early on that industry was the key to his career. He became the fox guarding the hen house.

-Inventing the AIDS (Dr. Peter Duesberg)

Sencer placed the EIS network on full alert to monitor for cases of swine flu. The large Auditorium A, located in CDC headquarters in Atlanta, became the command center--called the "War Room." Set up especially for this occasion, it contained "banks of telephones, teleprinters, and computers, the hardware for an unprecedented monitoring system which, to work, also required a typing pool, photocopy machines, and doctors sitting at rows of desks in the center of the room." Experts worked around the clock, week after week, chasing down every rumor of flu clusters.

Sencer officially called for the most aggressive emergency immunization crusade in history to be conducted before the flu season arrived. Congress initially favored the idea; not understanding the CDC's bias for infectious epidemics, the naive legislators easily could be manipulated by the CDC's alarmist rhetoric. President Ford appointed a committee that met within two days of Sencer's vaccination proposal and decided to back Sencer's plan, which would run up costs into the hundreds of millions of dollars. The air of panic spread rapidly: "Minutes after the meeting ended, President Ford appeared on national television and called for the vaccination against swine flu of every man, woman, and child in the United States." The plan gained momentum, despite the fact that even the massive EIS surveillance program could not find any more cases of swine flu.

Government being manipulated by agency is a key theme here. Few (possibly none) of the politicians understood what was going on as it was going on. Some figured it out later. But the CDC tail most definitely wagged the government dog.

This is a key point. If an agency can manipulate government, what happens when another agency manipulates the agency that manipulates the government? A master agency if you will.

Can you think of one? How about the World Health Organisation?

If you control the master agency, you have a back door into controlling all governments. That is clearly what is happening today.

-The Real Anthony Fauci (Robert Kennedy Jr.)

Pharma and NIAID told Congress, the White House, and the public that the Fort Dix swine flu was the same strain responsible for the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which, they warned, had killed 50 million people worldwide. They were lying; scientists at Fort Dix, the CDC, and HHS knew that H1N1 was an ordinary pig virus posing no risk for humans. Nevertheless, NIAID conducted a hard-sell campaign warning of one million deaths in the United States. Working with the pharmaceutical companies, NIAID, CDC, and Merck persuaded incoming president Gerald Ford to sign a bill appropriating $135 million for vaccine manufacturers to inoculate 140 million Americans against the pestilence.

At the behest of federal regulators, Ford appeared on TV urging all Americans to get vaccinated. Ford’s obligatory references to the 1918 Spanish flu mass fatalities inspired some 50 million US citizens to hotfoot it to their local health center for injections of hastily concocted, shoddily tested, zero-liability vaccines that HHS and Merck conspired to rush to market. CDC director David Sencer set up a swine flu “war room” to bolster public fear amongst an enthused media. The government launched a full-scale promotional campaign, including terrifying TV commercials depicting remorseful patients who dodged their vaccination and suffered serious illness. A CDC press release claimed that popular TV star Mary Tyler Moore had taken the jab. Moore told 60 Minutes she had avoided the shot due to her concerns about side effects. She said that she and her doctor were very happy she didn’t get it.

Mary Tyler Moore

Does the propaganda, sorry I meant campaign, of 1976 sound familiar?

-Inventing the AIDS (Dr. Peter Duesberg)

But when early testing showed that the vaccine produced side effects in 20 percent to 40 percent of inoculated people and potentially deadly reactions such as high fevers in 1 percent to 5 percent, insurance companies backed away from supporting the program. With no insurance coverage, Congress became nervous and also began retreating before the plan came up for a vote. Now Sencer faced serious trouble, his whole reputation standing on the line. No longer able to back out quietly, he chose instead to push more aggressively. The word went out to the EIS network to pursue actively any flu-like illness whatsoever. Sencer had to convince Congress that the swine flu epidemic was real.

Meanwhile, another CDC official took note of the swine flu alert:

By early July 1976 David Fraser, M.D., hoped that a suitable epidemic would soon appear in the United States. His definition of "suitable" was quite specific; the outbreak would have no known cause; it could present a serious threat to human life and might even have claimed some victims, thus providing the corpses for all-important tissue samples. With every day that passed, his need for that epidemic grew more urgent. He cast his net wide for news that somewhere between Alaska and the Mexican border a mysterious malady had surfaced. He made sure he was never far from a telephone.

Fraser was the head of the Special Pathogens Branch of the CDC, the section charged with investigating infectious diseases with unknown causes. He had been an EIS member since 1971, and he was awaiting two new EIS trainees who would shortly be assigned to his office. He wanted to give them field experience through managing a real epidemic. With the EIS on full alert, a "suitable epidemic" was likely to be found on short order, selectable from the thousand or more disease outbreaks occurring each year in this country.

The first "suitable" choice presented itself in Philadelphia, days after American Legion members had returned home from their July convention. On Monday morning, August 2, after receiving word of a few pneumonia cases, personnel in the CDC's swine flu War Room established contact with Jim Beecham, a brand-new EIS officer barely settling down to his assignment in the Philadelphia health department. The CDC could not directly intervene in the situation without an invitation, and Beecham helped arrange one immediately. Within hours three EIS officers flew to Philadelphia. They were joined by David Fraser the next morning, followed within days by a team of dozens of CDC experts.

State and local health departments had been willing to accept EIS officers on temporary assignment because of their qualifications and training. But as Philadelphia health officials now discovered, this amounted to a Faustian pact. When the CDC personnel arrived, prepositioned EIS members such as Beecham and top health advisor Robert Sharrar stopped obeying local authorities and began following orders from the incoming CDC team. Local officials became helpless to stop the tide of events. The CDC seized the initiative, fomenting rumors that this "Legionnaires' disease" was the beginning of the swine flu pandemic. The media proved cooperative; the New York Times assigned none other than EIS alumnus Lawrence Altman to cover the story.

With nationwide hysteria rapidly developing, Congress suddenly changed its collective opinion on the swine flu bill, pulling it out of committee and passing the legislation within days. By the time the CDC team officially acknowledged that Legionnaires' disease was not swine flu after all, President Ford had already signed the vaccine bill into law. David Fraser continued managing the CDC investigation for a few more weeks, allowing his new EIS people plenty of training. After testing the patients for infection by a variety of germs, the CDC experts found nothing consistent and packed their bags to leave. The case was declared unresolved and effectively dropped, leaving Philadelphia officials to pick up the pieces.

This cavalier treatment and the one-track focus on infectious microbes so enraged New York Congressman John Murphy that he held hearings on Legionnaires' disease in November. Calling CDC officials to testify on their "fiasco," Murphy humiliated the agency for not having found the epidemic's cause and for ignoring the possibility of noncontagious or toxic causes. "The CDC, for example, did not have a toxicologist present in their initial team of investigators sent to deal with the swine flu epidemic," he fumed at the meetings. "No apparent precautions were taken to deal with the possibility, however remote at the time, that something else might have been the cause." Likely smarting from the attack, David Fraser returned to Atlanta and put laboratory experts to work on the tissue samples collected from Philadelphia. Fraser's own area of expertise lay in bacteria, not viruses, and the researchers under his supervision searched hard for bacteria. Within a few weeks they found one, a harmless microbe that inhabits soil as well as plumbing in most buildings. Even though the bacterium fails Koch's postulates for causing disease, the CDC cleared its reputation and convinced the unsuspecting public it had discovered the cause of Legionnaires' disease. In the process the CDC created a whole field of study devoted to this bacterium, which now employs a respectable number of scientists.

The swine flu program, on the other hand, collapsed and could not be salvaged. Millions of people received the vaccine starting in October, although many were not told of the possible side effects. Soon, reports of hundreds of cases of paralysis began pouring in, ultimately including at least six hundred cases and seventy-four deaths. The CDC attempted to classify the victims as having died of other diseases. Ultimately, the vaccine's side effects could no longer be hidden, and the expensive scandal cost David Sencer his job as CDC chief. Ironically, the swine flu epidemic itself never materialized; only the CDC's immunization program caused sickness and death.

It’s worth repeating:

The CDC attempted to classify the victims as having died of other diseases.

Sound familiar? They have a long history of dirty tricks, it’s nothing new. Millions of people around the world are injured and a couple of hundred thousand have died in the US alone from today’s genetics, but the CDC position today is that there are no deaths in the US caused by the jabs. They all most of died of “other diseases”.

-The Real Anthony Fauci (Robert Kennedy Jr.)

In the end, the actual number of pandemic swine flu casualties in 1976 was not 1 million, but one. Dr. Harvey Fineberg, who authored the government’s 1978 comprehensive postmortem of NIAID’s response to that fake pandemic, told the WHO Bulletin: “In ’76, the virus was detected in a single military installation, at Fort Dix, New Jersey. In the ensuing weeks and months, not one related swine flu case was reported elsewhere in New Jersey, the USA or anywhere else in the world… . At the same time, political decision-makers consistently thought that the scientists were giving them no choice but to go ahead with a mass immunization programme.”

NIH’s influenza and flu vaccine expert senior bacteriologist and virologist Dr. John Anthony Morris informed his HHS bosses that the flu scare was a farce and that NIAID’s campaign was a boondoggle to promote a dangerous and ineffective flu vaccine for a greedy industry. Dr. Morris had worked for thirty- six years at federal public health agencies beginning in 1940. His office, at the time of the 1976 “outbreak,” was a few doors down the hall from Tony Fauci’s. Morris served as the government’s chief vaccine officer and led research on the flu and flu vaccines for the Bureau of Biologics Standards (BBS) at NIH and later at FDA. Morris enjoyed a distinguished career researching viral respiratory diseases. When Dr. Morris protested the fraud, his direct superior ordered him to stand down, advising Morris “not to talk about this.” His NIH bosses threatened Dr. Morris with loss of employment and professional ruin if he failed to keep his mouth shut. When vaccine recipients began reporting adverse reactions, including Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS), Dr. Morris disobeyed orders. Publicly declaring that there was zero evidence that the Fort Dix swine flu was contagious to humans, he reiterated, the vaccine could induce neurological side effects. In response, HHS officials confiscated Dr. Morris’s research materials, changed the laboratory locks, moved him to a small room with no telephone, reassigned his laboratory staff, forbade him to see visitors except with permission, and blocked his efforts to publish his findings. Finally, after months of threats and petty harassment, HHS fired Morris for insubordination, citing a long list of drummed-up charges, including failure to return library books on time.

That single death in 1976 was the first “case” of 19 year old Private David Lewis.

This from a 2009 article published in Salon.

In January 1976, 19-year old U.S. Army Private David Lewis, stationed at Fort Dix, joined his platoon on a 50-mile hike through the New Jersey snow. Lewis didn't have to go; he was suffering from flu and had been confined to his quarters by his unit's medical officer. Thirteen miles into the hike, Lewis collapsed and died a short time later of pneumonia caused by influenza. Because Lewis was young, generally healthy and should not have succumbed to the common flu, his death set off a cascade of uncertainty that confused the scientists, panicked the government and eventually embittered a public made distrustful of authority by Vietnam and Watergate.

-Inventing the AIDS (Dr. Peter Duesberg)

Allegheny County Coroner Cyril H. Wecht personally investigated some of the vaccine's most unfortunate victims, including several fatalities. In a stinging indictment of this CDC program, he wrote in 1978:

The government should limit itself to facilitating public programs. Employing high-pressure sales tactics like Madison Avenue mass media promoters to push a program is not commensurate with this objective. Certainly, when people's lives are at stake, cheap politics has no place.

That is a fitting end to Duesberg’s section on 1976.

-The Real Anthony Fauci (Robert Kennedy Jr.)

Over at CDC, scientist Dr. Michael Hatwick was also warning HHS bigwigs that the flu vaccine could cause widespread brain injuries.

Dr. Michael Hatwick

The 1976 swine flu vaccine was so fraught with problems that HHS discontinued the jab after vaccinating 49 million Americans. According to news accounts, the incidence of flu was seven times greater among the vaccinated than the unvaccinated. Furthermore, the vaccine caused some 500 cases of the degenerative nerve disease Guillain-Barré Syndrome, 32 deaths,14 more than 400 paralyzations, and as many as 4,000 other injuries.

Public health officials pulled the vaccine. President Ford fired David Sencer.

American taxpayers ended up paying for the swine flu vaccine coming and going, through guaranteed profits for Merck at the front end and outlays for piles of lawsuits from vaccine injury victims on the other side.

The government paid $134 million for the swine flu vaccine program. Injured plaintiffs filed 1,604 lawsuits. By April 1985, the government had paid out $83,233,714 and spent tens of millions of dollars adjudicating and processing those claims. In 1987, Dr. Morris testified before Congress, “These figures give some idea of the consequences resulting from a program in which the federal government assumes liability of a product known to produce, in an indeterminate number of recipients, serious damage to health… . When I left the FDA in 1976, there was no available technique to measure, reliably and consistently, neurotoxicity or potency of most of vaccines then in use, including DTP vaccines. Today [1987], 11 years later, the situation remains essentially the same.” Dr. Morris’s research found that flu vaccines often induced fever in children and in pregnant women, and serious harm to the fetus. He worried that there were hidden risks for everyone because the vaccine was “literally loaded with extraneous bacteria.” According to Dr. Morris, “There is a great deal of evidence to prove that immunization of children does more harm than good.” In what serves as a concise epithet for his crosses, Dr. Morris stated, “There is a close tie between government scientists and manufacturing scientists. My results were hurting the market for flu vaccines.”

In 1977, Dr. Morris instituted a wrongful dismissal suit. The court overturned all NIH’s charges against him. Subsequently a grievance committee unanimously found that his supervisors had harassed and wrongfully terminated Dr. Morris. A group of former FDA and NIH scientists endorsed Dr. Morris’s criticisms of the agency. The New York Times quoted a fellow scientist, B. G. Young, who characterized NIH’s reprisals against honest scientists as “suppression, harassment, and censorship of individual investigators… . I finally came to realize that you either had to compromise yourself or leave. Morris and (Bernice) Eddy are the real heroes in that place because they stayed and fought. The others voted with their feet and left.”

Up until his death in July 2014, Dr. Morris remained an outspoken critic of CDC’s annual flu shot program. In 1979, Dr. Morris told the Washington Post, “It’s a medical rip-off… . I believe the public should have truthful information on the basis of which they can determine whether or not to take the vaccine… . I believe that given full information, they won’t take the vaccine.” Dr. Morris’s 2014 New York Times obituary reported his statement, “The producers of these [influenza] vaccines know they are worthless, but they go on selling them anyway.”

Dr. B. G. Young told the New York Times that NIH’s industry-dominated culture at the vaccine division had driven away all the honest regulators—those willing to stand up to pharma. Dr. Fauci, in contrast, is the rare scientist who lasted fifty years at HHS. He has done so largely by aligning himself with NIH’s pharma overlords and carrying industry water.

The same weapons that NIH used to silence Dr. Morris— enforced isolation, disgrace, prohibiting him from publishing papers, presenting at conferences, or talking to the press, changing his laboratory locks to prevent further research—were already pieces of an established Soviet-style template for silencing dissident scientists at NIH. The agency first unsheathed those weapons in the 1950s to destroy the career of its award-winning virologist, Dr. Bernice Eddy, the discoverer of the poliomyelitis virus—who later found a cancer-causing monkey virus in the Salk and Sabin polio vaccines. When her research disclosed problems with vaccine safety, NIH officials banned Dr. Eddy from her lab, changed her office locks, and ordered her to refrain from interviews and speeches. After silencing Eddy, NIH gave the contaminated vaccine to 99 million baby boomers, who suffered a tenfold increase in soft tissue cancers, resulting in a public health disaster that dwarfs the harms of polio. Dr. Fauci and government health regulators later used these same techniques to muzzle a parade of in-house scientists, including Dr. Judy Mikovits, NIH contract researcher Dr. Bart Classen, and CDC’s varicella (chicken pox) vaccine researcher Dr. Gary Goldman, who dared to tell hard truths about vaccine safety and efficacy.

The 1976 swine flu event was the first time that the federal government agreed to serve as pharma’s insurer. The episode taught the public an important lesson: tort immunity incentivizes dangerous and ineffective vaccines. Industry and the magisterial class learned an entirely different morale from the tragic episode. In 1986 they made swine flu vaccine template the model for the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, which shielded all mandated vaccines from liability.

At the dawn of Dr. Fauci’s career, he learned that both pandemics and fake pandemics provide an opportunity to expand the bureaucracy’s power and to multiply the wealth of its pharma partners.

If you made it this far, great!

Now, when you watch the 60 minutes story you will have a much broader context for what actually happened. (click on image)

In conclusion, it has happened before, there is a “they”, they don’t have bulbous noses, well maybe Sencer did, and “they” are at it again, just on a much, much larger scale.

Doing a “reference check” with ex-wifes can be very useful.